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Kata Bohus 
Not a Jewish Question? 
The Holocaust in Hungary in the Press and Propaganda of  the 
Kádár Regime during the Trial of  Adolf  Eichmann
In this paper, I examine the trial of  Adolf  Eichmann, portrayals of  the trial in the 
contemporaneous Hungarian press, and the effects of  the trial and the coverage on the 
formation of  Holocaust memory in communist Hungary. The trial presented a problem 
for communist propaganda because it highlighted the destruction of  Jews as the worst 
crime of  the Nazi regime. While communist ideology’s anti-fascism defi ned its stance 
as “anti-anti-Semitic,” the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of  World War II as a confl ict 
between two opposing, ideologically defi ned camps (fascists and anti-fascists) made 
it diffi cult to accommodate the idea of  non-political victimhood, e.g. the destruction 
of  Jews on the basis of  racist ideas and not because of  their political commitments. 
Moreover, because of  Eichmann’s wartime mission in Hungary, it was clear that the 
trial would feature a great deal of  discussion about his activities there. Therefore, the 
Hungarian Kádár regime devoted considerable attention to the event, both within 
the Party and in the press. The analysis concentrates on two aspects: what did the 
highest echelons of  the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party intend to emphasize in the 
Hungarian coverage of  the trial and what kinds of  interpretations actually appeared in 
the press. In the end, the party’s political goals were only partially achieved. Control over 
newspapers guaranteed that certain key propaganda themes were included rather than 
ensuring that other narratives would be excluded. I argue that, while the Kádár regime 
in Hungary did not intend to emphasize the Jewish catastrophe and certainly did not 
seek to draw attention to its Hungarian chapter, as a consequence of  the Eichmann trial 
there nevertheless emerged a narrative of  the Hungarian Holocaust. Through various 
organs of  the press, this narrative found public expression. Though this Holocaust 
narrative can be considered ideologically loaded and distorted, some of  its elements 
continue to preoccupy historians who study the period today.
Keywords: Adolf  Eichmann, communism in Hungary, Holocaust memory, communist 
press and propaganda
Adolf  Eichmann, a former Nazi SS-Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) was 
captured by Israeli secret agents in Buenos Aires, Argentina on May 11, 1960. 
He was subsequently transported to Israel, where he would stand trial, indicted 
on 15 criminal charges, including crimes against humanity, crimes against the 
Jewish people and membership in a hostile organization (SD, Sicherheitsdienst des 
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Reichsführers SS) during the period of  Nazi rule in Germany. His trial began in 
Jerusalem on April 11, 1961. He was pronounced guilty on December 11 and 
executed in the spring of  1962.
Many historians have argued that the Eichmann trial signalled a defi ning 
moment in (if  not the real beginning of) Holocaust memory. David Cesarani 
noted that “the capture, trial and execution of  Adolf  Eichmann […] changed 
forever perceptions of  the Nazi persecution and mass murder of  the Jews.”1 
Michael Rothberg went so far as to state that “the Eichmann trial brought the 
Nazi genocide of  European Jews into the public sphere for the fi rst time as 
a discrete event on an international scale.”2 In addition to the trial, Hannah 
Arendt’s iconic articles in the New Yorker magazine—later turned into the book 
Eichmann in Jerusalem—started the global scholarly debate about the character 
of  Adolf  Eichmann, the working logic of  the totalitarian state, and individual 
responsibility in its operation.3 
At Adolf  Eichmann’s trial, it was clear that there would be a lot of  discussion 
about his activities in Hungary during World War II. Arriving to Hungary in the 
footsteps of  the invading German troops, Sondereinsatzkommando Eichmann’s main 
task was to arrange, with the cooperation of  local authorities, the deportation 
of  the largest remaining Jewish population in Eastern Europe. The deportation 
of  over 400,000 people to Auschwitz-Birkenau between mid-May and early July 
1944 and the rapid mass extermination of  their vast majority there during the last 
phase of  the war helped turn the site into a central symbol of  the Holocaust. The 
military situation in the summer of  1944 compelled Hungary’s Regent Miklós 
Horthy to halt deportations, and despite the large-scale violence instituted by the 
radically anti-Semitic Arrow Cross (Nyilaskeresztes) government of  Ferenc Szálasi 
from October 1944 onwards, plans for the deportation of  Budapest’s sizeable 
Jewish community were never implemented. There were close to 200,000 Jewish 
survivors in post-war Hungarian territories,4 and despite its steady decline 
in numbers afterwards, the Hungarian Jewish community remained among 
the biggest in Central-Eastern Europe. Thus, for the Israeli Court that tried 
Eichmann, it was almost impossible to fi nd survivor witnesses who had been 
1  David Cesarani, ed., After Eichmann. Collective Memory and the Holocaust after 1961 (London–New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 1.
2  Michael Rothberg, “Beyond Eichmann: Rethinking the emergence of  Holocaust memory,” in History 
and Theory 46, no. 1 (2007): 74.
3  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of  Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963).
4  Tamás Stark, “A magyar zsidóság a vészkorszakban és a második világháború után,” in Regio. Kisebbség, 
politika, társadalom 4, no. 3 (1993): 140–51.
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in contact with Eichmann during the war with the possible exception of  those 
from Hungary.5 For these reasons, the Hungarian Holocaust became the most 
important chapter of  the Eichmann trial.
This paper examines the trial’s effects on the formation of  Holocaust 
memory in communist Hungary. While some academics assert that the memory 
of  the Holocaust was completely suppressed in the Soviet Union6 and its 
Eastern European communist counterparts,7 others argue that it was normalized 
5  It must be noted that the Israeli court’s choice of  witnesses was strategic and infl uenced by politics. For 
details see: Hanna Yablonka, The State of  Israel vs. Adolf  Eichmann (New York: Schocken, 2004), esp. 88–120. 
Thirteen witnesses of  Hungarian origin testifi ed during the trial. Pinhas (previously Fülöp) Freudiger, 
who had been the head of  the Orthodox Jewish community in Budapest from 1939. After the German 
invasion, he was appointed to the Jewish Council of  Budapest. He and his family escaped to Romania in 
August, 1944 and settled in Israel after the war. Dr. Alexander (previously Sándor) Bródy, a writer who was 
assigned to labor service during the war and served as the director of  the Joint-funded National Hungarian 
Jewish Aid Action (Országos Magyar Zsidó Segítő Akció, O.M.ZS.A.) from 1944. He left Hungary in 1949 and 
settled in Brazil. Mrs. Elisheva (Erzsébet) Szenes, a Slovakian-born journalist who escaped to Budapest but 
was then captured by the SS and sent to Auschwitz. She survived and settled in Israel after the war. Margit 
Reich whose husband perished in Auschwitz. She lived in Givatayim, Israel at the time of  the trial but her 
children remained in Hungary. Dr. Martin Földi, a lawyer who was taken to Auschwitz. He moved to Israel 
after the war. Ze’ev Sapir, who was born in the village of  Dobradovo, near the town of  Munkács. He was 
deported to Auschwitz and subsequently sent to the Jaworzno labor camp. After surviving the war, he 
emigrated to Israel and worked with Youth Aliyah as a youth leader and teacher. Avraham Gordon, who 
was a minor living in Budapest during the war, and was forced to work at Eichmann’s villa in Buda. He was 
living in Israel at the time of  the trial and worked at the Timna Copper Works. Dr. Tibor Ferencz, lawyer, 
who served as Prosecutor with the People’s Prosecution Offi ce (Népbíróság) after the war and was present 
at the trials of  László Baky and László Endre. He moved to Israel in 1957. Joel Brand, who was born in 
Naszód, Transylvania but grew up in Germany. During the Second World War, he was a member of  the 
Relief  and Rescue Committee which helped Jews escape to Hungary in the initial years of  the war. After 
Hungary’s German occupation, the organization’s main goal became to save Jewish lives. Brand emigrated 
to Israel and lived in Tel Aviv at the time of  the trial. Hansi Brand, Joel Brand’s wife, born in Budapest in 
1912. She was also a member of  the Relief  and Rescue Committee. Moshe (Móse) Rosenberg was born in 
Hungary and served as the Chairman of  the Jewish National Fund and also the member of  the Relief  and 
Rescue Committee. He left Hungary on the Kasztner train and consequently moved to Israel. Arye Zvi 
Breszlauer, lawyer, who was born in Vyšní Ridniczi, Eastern Slovakia, an area that had belonged to Hungary 
until 1918. During the war, he participated in the rescue operations of  the Swiss Consulate in Budapest. 
Aviva Fleischmann, who was a hairdresser in Budapest during the war. Leslie Gordon, who was deported 
from Budapest to Kamianets-Podilskyi in 1941 and was living in Canada at the time of  the trial. 
6  See for example: William Korey, “Down History’s Memory Hole: Soviet Treatment of  the Holocaust,” 
in Present Tense 10, no. 2 (1983): 53.
7  See for example: Randolph L. Braham, “Assault on Historical Memory: Hungarian Nationalists and 
the Holocaust,” in Hungary and the Holocaust: Confrontation with the Past. Symposium Proceedings, United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, 2001, esp. 51; Shari J. Cohen, 
Politics without a Past: The Absence of  History in Post-communist Nationalism (Durham, NC: Duke University 
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through presentations of  the events as parts of  a larger phenomenon.8  The idea 
that the Holocaust in Hungary was a taboo topic in communist Hungary has 
been a persistent thesis in academia, but some researchers have recently started 
to reassess this claim.9 
This paper argues that, while the Kádár regime in Hungary did not intend 
to emphasize the Jewish catastrophe and certainly not to draw attention to its 
Hungarian chapter of  1944, there nevertheless emerged, as a consequence of  the 
Eichmann trial, a narrative of  the Hungarian Holocaust. Through the various 
organs of  the press, this narrative found public expression. Thus, the thesis 
according to which the Holocaust was taboo does not hold up to sustained 
scrutiny. Though this Holocaust narrative can be considered ideologically loaded 
and distorted, some of  its elements—especially the question of  Hungarian 
collaboration with Eichmann’s Sondereinsatzkommando in the deportation of  
Hungarian Jews—continue to preoccupy historians who study the period today.
This paper approaches the subject from a comparative perspective, taking 
into account state policies and the coverage of  the Eichmann trial in other bloc 
countries as well. The comparative perspective helps accentuate systemic (bloc-
wide) and country-specifi c goals of  the party, and thus separates the strength 
of  general communist ideological determinants from local policy factors in the 
presentation of  the Eichmann trial. The analysis concentrates on two aspects: 
what the highest echelons of  communist parties intended to emphasize in the 
Hungarian interpretation of  the trial, and what kind of  interpretation appeared 
in the press. In the end, the party’s political goals were only partially achieved. 
Control over newspapers simply guaranteed that certain key propaganda themes 
were included, rather than ensuring that other narratives would be excluded. 
Press, 1999), esp. 85–118 (on Czechoslovakia); Michael Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory 
of  the Holocaust (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997).
8  Zvi Gitelman, “Politics and Historiography of  the Holocaust in the Soviet Union,” in Bitter Legacy. 
Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR, ed. idem (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1997), 14–42.
9  A detailed analysis of  the period’s memory politics can be found in Regina Fritz, Nach Krieg und Judenmord. 
Ungarns Geschichtspolitik seit 1944 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012), 229–78. Dániel Véri has examined, in various 
publications and exhibitions, the memory of  the Holocaust in Hungarian art during the communist period. 
See for example his A halottak élén: Major János világa (Budapest: MKE, 2013). Some of  the contributions in 
Vera Surányi, ed., Minarik, Sonnenschein és a többiek: zsidó sorsok magyar fi lmen (Budapest: MZSKE–Szombat, 
2001) show the presentation of  the Holocaust in Hungarian movies between 1945 and 1989. Teri Szűcs has 
focused on the representation of  the Holocaust in literature, see especially her book A felejtés története – A 
Holokauszt tanúsága irodalmi művekben (Budapest: Kalligram, 2011).
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Owing to a variety of  factors, a partial narrative of  the Hungarian specifi cities 
of  the Holocaust did surface in the media.
A Problem for the Bloc
As the communist regimes aimed to offer an interpretation of  World War II 
which would not only fi t their contemporary Cold War narrative, but would 
also correspond to the principles of  Marxism-Leninism, the Eichmann case 
presented a challenge to them. Communist doctrine interpreted World War II as 
the struggle between Fascism and anti-Fascism, but the proceedings of  the trial 
focused fi rst and foremost on Eichmann’s (and more broadly Nazi Germany’s) 
atrocities against Jews. That Jews were not targeted because of  their political 
beliefs was hard to fi t into the framework of  the ideologically defi ned struggle 
put forward by the communists. The tension between these historical narratives 
posed a problem for all countries of  the Eastern bloc on a systemic level.
Though there is no single coherent Marxist-Leninist theory of  Fascism, 
it is possible to highlight some of  the most important elements that Marxist 
thinkers and communist propagandists emphasized even well before World War 
II. Communist regimes were anti-fascist on an ideological basis, thus in their 
interpretation, World War II was fi rst and foremost a fi ght between Fascism 
and anti-Fascism. During the interwar period, a number of  Marxist theories 
described Fascism as a reactionary ideology supported by the petty bourgeoisie 
which aimed to crush the working class (which was opposed to capitalism).10 
In the 1930s, Bulgarian communist leader George Dimitrov saw Fascism as the 
terroristic dictatorship of  monopoly capitalism,11 while the offi cial Comintern 
defi nition saw it as a tool of  “fi nance capital” which aspired to create an 
organized mass basis.12 This strictly materialistic defi nition remained the offi cial 
interpretation in communist countries until 1989. 
After the war, the maintenance of  the anti-fascist narrative had several 
functions in Eastern Europe. First, it served as a reminder of  the successful 
struggle of  communists in general, and the Soviet Union in particular, against 
10  David Beetham, ed., Marxists in Face of  Fascism: Writings by Marxists on Fascism from the Interwar Period 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), 197–204; Léon Trotsky, The Struggle against Fascism in 
Germany (London: Pathfi nder, 1971), 155–56.
11  George Dimitrov, Against Fascism and War (New York: International Publishers, 1986), 2.
12  “Theses on Fascism, the War Danger and the Tasks of  the Communist Parties,” in The Communist 
International: 1919–1943. Documents, vol. 3, ed. Jane Degras (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), esp. 
296.
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Nazi Germany13 which was viewed not only as a military victory, but also a moral 
one.14 Furthermore, anti-Fascism was used to legitimize post-war communist 
rule by presenting it as the only guarantee against the resurgence of  Fascism.15 
Finally, the theoretical linkage between Fascism and capitalism served as a basis 
for attacks against Western European countries and the United States in the 
ideological battles of  the Cold War. Communist regimes claimed that social 
oppression was not limited to Nazi Germany, but was inherent to all socio-
economic structures based on capitalism. In the context of  a struggle between 
Fascism and anti-Fascism, the persecution of  Jews was never the primary focus 
of  communist interpretations of  the war. 
The Eichmann trial posed another problem for “real socialist” states, in 
that Israel claimed the role of  the main representative and articulator of  Jewish 
interests. Each of  the Eastern European communist countries still had Jewish 
communities (some larger, some smaller) living within its territory. That the most 
recent history of  these communities would be interpreted through a framework 
defi ned by an Israeli court was highly undesirable for communist leaderships 
from a historical point of  view. The editor of  the Communist Party of  the Soviet 
Union’s main newspaper, Pravda, talked candidly with Israeli diplomats at the 
time of  the trial about Soviet unwillingness to cooperate openly on that basis. 
“We are not interested in strengthening the impression that Israel is the main 
defender of  the Jewish people. The Red Army saved thousands of  Jews”, he 
was quoted as having said. 16 Furthermore, the political dimension raised further 
issues for communist propaganda with regards to the trial. Especially since the 
Suez Crisis of  1956 and because of  the increasingly Western orientation of  its 
foreign policies, Israel was viewed as the “mainstay of  Western imperialism” in 
the Middle East.17 The country’s ever closer relations with West Germany since 
13  Nina Tumarkin, “The Great Patriotic War as myth and memory,” European Review 11, no. 4 (2003): 
596.
14  Nati Cantorovich, “Soviet Reactions to the Eichmann Trial: Preliminary Investigations 1960–1965,” 
Yad Vashem Studies 35, no. 2 (2007): 106.
15  François Furet, The Passing of  an Illusion: The Idea of  Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: 
University of  Chicago Press, 1999), esp. 396–437; Mark R. Thompson, “Reluctant revolutionaries: Anti-
Fascism and the East German opposition” German Politics 8, no. 1 (1999): 43; James Mark, “Antifascism, the 
1956 Revolution and the Politics of  the Communist Autobiographies in Hungary 1944–2000,” Europe–Asia 
Studies 58, no. 8 (2006): 1209–40. 
16  Avigdor Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem. Twenty years of  relations between Israel and the Soviet Union (London–
New York–Toronto: Abelard-Schuman, 1970), 138–39.
17  Yosef  Govrin, Israeli–Soviet Relations 1953–1967. From Confrontation to Disruption (London: Frank Cass, 
1997), 45.
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the 1950s were described by communist propaganda as evidence of  the Jewish 
state’s clear pact with Communism’s archenemy in Europe.18 This situation, 
therefore, raised important practical questions for the whole bloc with regards 
to the trial. Communist states had to decide if  they would collaborate with the 
Israeli court (for example, by providing it with documentation), and whether 
the authority of  the Israeli court to pronounce judgment on Eichmann could or 
should be acknowledged at all, instead of  insisting on the trial of  Eichmann in 
Eastern Europe.
There were also certain country-specifi c problems that the capture of  
Adolf  Eichmann and his trial presented for Eastern European leaders. A generic 
narrative of  communists fi ghting a war against Fascism was especially inaccurate 
in the Hungarian context. As opposed to Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria, the 
home-bred communist movement in Hungary, which, according to this generic 
narrative, fought domestic “fascists,” was weak and received little support from 
the population. As opposed to Poland, a country “without a Quisling and, in 
all of  Nazi-controlled Europe, the place least likely to assist the German war 
effort,”19 Hungary entered the war on the side of  Nazi Germany and remained 
its ally despite the abortive attempt to switch sides in 1944. Thus, unlike 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, each of  which produced considerable resistance 
movements during World War II, Hungary had only generated a weak and 
insignifi cant equivalent.20 All of  these inconvenient details made any narrative of  
a widespread popular struggle against Fascism during World War II particularly 
hard to substantiate, and the Eichmann trial threatened to highlight these 
contradictions.
Other bloc countries were wary of  the impending trial for other reasons. The 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), as the socialist German state and “Victor 
of  History” (Sieger der Geschichte), “exempted itself  from all political and historical 
responsibility for the German past.”21 For East Germany, the Eichmann case 
thus represented an unparalleled opportunity and a very dangerous situation at 
the same time. It was an opportunity to condemn publicly the Federal Republic 
of  Germany (FRG) as the sole ideological and political heir of  Nazi Germany, as 
18  Ibid., 80.
19  John Connelly, “Why the Poles Collaborated so Little: And Why That is No Reason for Nationalist 
Hubris,” in Slavic Review 64, no. 4 (2005): 772.
20  István Deák, “A Fatal Compromise? The Debate Over Collaboration and Resistance in Hungary,” 
East European Politics and Society 9, no. 2 (1995): 209–33.
21  Katharina von Ankum, “Victims, Memory, History: Anti-Fascism and the Question of  National 
Identity in East German Narratives after 1990,” in History and Memory 7, no. 2 (1995): 42.
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opposed to the GDR, “the only true anti-fascist state on German soil.”22 It was 
a danger because of  the risk that leading or well-known East German political 
and intellectual personalities might be implicated at any point in the criminal 
process against Adolf  Eichmann. In early 1960, perhaps as an answer to earlier 
East German accusations, the FRG government issued a Bulletin about former 
Nazis who had pursued remarkable careers in the GDR. The list included not 
only scholars, artists, members of  the press and diplomatic services, but also 
several staff  executives of  the Communist Party. The bulletin mentioned 56 
former NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) members in the 
East German parliament that had been elected in November 1958.23 Moreover, 
perhaps to a greater extent than countries of  the bloc that had existed before 
1945, the propaganda of  the GDR especially favored a future-oriented approach 
to national identity based on the “concept of  successful struggle rather than 
a commemoration of  past sacrifi ces or an acknowledgement of  past failures 
and defeats.”24 The criminal procedure against Adolf  Eichmann forced GDR 
propagandists to turn back towards the past and engage with the politics of  
history. 
In Poland, the socialist regime prioritized a narrative of  Polish victimhood 
at the hands of  Nazi occupiers during World War II.25 The Polish self-image as 
the “martyr of  the nations” went back (at least) to the nineteenth century,26 and 
was strengthened by the brutality of  the Nazi occupation regime during World 
War II.27 The political leadership used this historical imagery to legitimize the 
country’s post-war Western borders and to divert attention from the fact that the 
Soviet occupation of  Poland during the war was also tragic. The emphasis on 
22  Jan Herman Brinks, “Political Anti-Fascism in the German Democratic Republic,” Journal of  
Contemporary History 32, no. 2 (1997): 210. On attempts of  the East German Stasi to stage anti-Semitic 
incidents in West Germany see Michael Wolffsohn, Die Deutschland-Akte: Juden und Deutsche in Ost und West: 
Tatsachen und Legende (Munich: Ferenczy bei Bruckmann, 1995).
23  Brinks, “Political Anti-Fascism,” 212–16. On the politics of  the past in the DDR and Nazi war crimes 
see for example Henry Leide, NS-Verbrecher und Staatssicherheit: Die geheime Vergangenheitspolitik der DDR 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006).
24  Ankum, “Victims, Memory, History,” 42.
25  Barbara Szacka, “Polish Remembrance of  WWII,” International Journal of  Sociology 36, no. 4 (2006–07): 12.
26  Norman Davies, Heart of  Europe. A Short History of  Poland (London: Clarendon Press, 1984), 202; 
Gerhard Wagner, “Nationalism and Cultural Memory in Poland: the European Union Turns East” in 
International Journal of  Politics, Culture, and Society 17, no. 2 (2003): 205.
27  Joanna Wawrzyniak, “On the Making of  Second World War Myths. War Veterans, Victims and the 
Communist State in Poland, 1945–1969,” in Die Weltkriege als symbolische Bezugspunkte: Polen, die Tschechoslowakei 
und Deutschland nach dem Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Natali Stegmann (Prague: Masarykův ústav a Archiv 
AV ČR, 2009), 204–05.
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Eichmann’s crimes against Jews was a competing narrative of  what had happened 
in occupied Poland, and as such particularly challenging from the point of  view 
of  this Polish self-image.
Given these bloc-wide and country-specifi c problems of  historical 
interpretations, the looming Eichmann trial (and the question of  the propaganda 
that should accompany it) was dealt with in the highest echelons of  the party.
Propaganda Goals, Hungarian Political Decisions and Bloc-Level Considerations
Even before Eichmann was captured, there had been signals from Moscow and 
elsewhere in the bloc as to which issues would later become prominent during 
his trial. The GDR had long been campaigning against West Germany, but 
starting in 1956, East German propagandists unleashed a full-scale attack. They 
claimed that former Nazis were in positions of  power in the Federal Republic. 
The Israeli Foreign Ministry reported a secret meeting of  the leaders of  Jewish 
communities from Poland, Romania, Hungary and East Germany in Warsaw in 
early February 1960. According to Israeli information, the goal of  the gathering 
had been to prepare a joint campaign against the Bonn government.28 Shortly 
after Eichmann’s capture was announced to the world, Soviet propaganda set 
out to attack West Germany, arguing that the country was trying to put a stop 
to the trial so as to prevent the exposure of  ex-Nazis active in the ranks of  the 
West German establishment.29 
The targeting of  the FRG stemmed from the Cold War power-balance, 
East Germany’s security concerns and its untenable economic and demographic 
situation at the time. Berlin was the only territory where the military forces of  the 
two superpowers directly confronted each other, which caused increased tension 
between them. Despite the assertions of  communist propaganda regarding the 
“crisis of  capitalism,” the number of  East German citizens escaping to the 
FRG was alarming for the political leaderships in both Berlin and Moscow.30 A 
recurrent theme of  the USSR’s propaganda campaign against the FRG was the 
supposed resurgence of  revanchism and militarism, signalling to some degree 
28  Letter from the Israeli Foreign Ministry to the Israeli Legations in Budapest, Warsaw and Bucharest, 
February 12, 1960. Papers of  the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs – Israeli Missions Abroad, Folder no. 
93.10/1–22, Israel State Archives.  
29  Cantorovich, “Soviet Reactions to the Eichmann Trial,” 111–15.
30  Between 1945 and 1961, about two and a half  million people fl ed the German Democratic Republic 
for the German Federal Republic, reducing the population of  the former by fi fteen percent. Frederick 
Taylor, The Berlin Wall. A World Divided, 1961–1989 (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), XVIII.
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existing Soviet anxiety of  a rearmed and nuclearized West Germany. In the light 
of  these long-term Soviet strategies, it was predictable that during the Eichmann 
trial, the main propaganda goal in the bloc would be to attack the FRG.
Another element that was likely to appear in offi cial communist comments 
on the Eichmann court procedure was a critical stance towards Israel. After a 
short period of  what Uri Bialer described as “knocking on any door,” Israel’s 
foreign policies became increasingly oriented towards the West from about the 
beginning of  the 1950s.31 During the Suez Crisis of  1956, Moscow sided with 
its Arab allies and after the war, Soviet-Israeli relations quickly deteriorated 
to an unprecedented low.32 Israel became the subject of  insulting attacks in 
the Soviet media as an aggressor, alongside France and Britain, who had also 
participated in the invasion of  Egypt. Furthermore, the USSR government was 
also trying to counter Soviet Jewish aspirations for emigration with an active 
anti-Israel propaganda campaign.33 The hostility towards the Jewish State would 
be sustained during the Eichmann trial.
In all probability, the Department of  Foreign Affairs of  the Central 
Committee of  the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP KB Külügyi 
Osztály) was well aware of  these trends, and it was the fi rst organ of  Hungary’s 
bureaucratic apparatus to work out a plan of  action to deal with the Eichmann 
case. Their fi rst proposal to the Politburo on June 24, 1960 suggested that 
Hungary should ask for the extradition of  Eichmann from Israel so that he 
could be tried by a Hungarian court, with the rationale that he committed a great 
majority of  his crimes against humanity in that country. 34 A trial held in Hungary 
would have also made it possible to control the ways in which evidence was 
presented, in other words how Eichmann’s activities in Hungary were narrated. 
The draft also proposed consultations with Czechoslovakia and Poland, two other 
bloc countries that were major sites of  Eichmann’s activities during the war.35 
31  Uri Bialer, Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation 1948–1956 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 2.
32  Benjamin Pinkus, The Soviet Government and the Jews 1948–1967. A Documented Study (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 239.
33  Ibid.
34  Proposal of  the Department of  Foreign Affairs of  the Central Committee of  the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party to the Politburo in relation to the Eichmann case, by Imre Hollai and János Péter, June 24, 
1960. Papers of  the Department of  Foreign Affairs, fond no. 288.32, document no. 1960/11, Hungarian 
National Archives.
35  In March 1939, Nazi Germany occupied Czechoslovakia and established a German Protectorate 
over Bohemia and Moravia. In the summer of  the same year, Eichmann became responsible for 
promoting the expulsion of  Czech Jews from the newly annexed Protectorate. Based on the pattern of  
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However, after some brief  deliberations with the Foreign Ministries of  these two 
states and the Soviet Union, the initial plan to request Eichmann’s extradition 
was dropped because of  the potential loss of  prestige for the socialist states if  
Israel refused. Though the Czechoslovaks originally considered supporting the 
extradition request, Polish authorities ruled it out because the plan would not 
have “the slightest prospect of  success, also because such a procedure would 
mean taking part in the confl ict between Argentina and Israel,36 and because such 
a claim might bring about a counter claim by the Federal Republic of  Germany, 
which is undesirable.”37 Instead, it was decided that any explicit recognition of  
the Israeli court’s jurisdiction was to be avoided.38 Such recognition would have 
run counter to the general position of  socialist states, according to which Israel 
had no right to speak on behalf  of  world Jewry. 
Given its strained relations with the state of  Israel, the Hungarian government 
was unsure if  it should fulfi ll the Israeli court’s request for documentation 
on Eichmann’s activities in the territory of  Hungary during the war. Though 
Czechoslovakia insisted on publishing the materials fi rst, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary both provided Israel with the materials indirectly, through two semi-
offi cial organizations the names of  which clearly mirror the offi cial narratives 
of  World War II. The National Committee of  Persons Persecuted by Nazism in 
Hungary (Nácizmus Magyarországi Üldözötteinek Országos Bizottsága) and the Union 
the Viennese Central Offi ce for Jewish Emigration (Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung), Eichmann created 
an offi ce in Prague. Eichmann stayed in Prague until October, 1939 before being called back to Berlin. 
After becoming director of  the RSHA section IV B 4 in March 1941, Eichmann played an important role 
in the deportation of  over one million Jews to killing sites mostly in occupied Poland. Eichmann arrived 
to Budapest years later, in March 1944. By that time, Jewish emigration had been stopped and the decision 
about the physical extermination of  Jews, the so-called “Final Solution”, had long been made. By then, 
Eichmann had considerable experience organizing the transportation of  Jews to extermination camps. 
Nevertheless, Sondereinsatzkommando Eichmann’s coordination in the deportation of  almost half  a million 
Jews to Auschwitz in an extremely short time (less than two months) was unprecedented.
36  In June 1960, Argentina requested a meeting of  the UN Security Council, claiming that the Israelis 
had violated the sovereign rights of  the republic when they had abducted Eichmann in Buenos Aires. 
After months of  negotiations and the involvement of  the Security Council, Israel and Argentina eventually 
agreed to end their dispute with a joint statement.
37  Czechoslovak Ministry of  Foreign Affairs to Antonín Novotný, August 12, 1960. Published in Marie 
Chrová, “Israel in the foreign and internal politics of  the Communist Party of  Czechoslovakia in the 
1960s and beyond” in Jewish Studies at the CEU, vol. 4, ed. András Kovács and Michael Miller (2004–2005) 
(Budapest: CEU, 2005), 264. 
38  Though the Hungarians did acknowledge it with regards to people who had become Israeli citizens 
by the time of  the trial.
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of  Anti-Fascist Fighters in Czechoslovakia39 (Svaz Protifašistických Bojovníků) were 
not affi liated with the Jewish communities or any Jewish organization for that 
matter. In Hungary, a volume entitled Eichmann in Hungary: Documents by Jenő 
Lévai appeared in English, German and French in March, 1961, clearly targeting 
Western audiences.40 It signalled an attempt by the Hungarian government 
to hold its grip over the historical memory of  the war, and made clear that 
the Eichmann case would not be an occasion to emphasize the Jewishness of  
the majority of  the war’s Hungarian victims. The resolution of  the Hungarian 
Politburo of  June 28, 1960 clearly outlined that the propaganda concerning the 
Eichmann trial should not focus on the historical narrative but on contemporary 
political goals.  According to the resolution, “in view of  neo-fascist symptoms 
visible in the life of  the Federal Republic of  Germany and the Zionist nature of  
the Israeli government’s foreign and domestic policy, [the case] must be used to 
strengthen the antifascist front against fascist efforts.”41 
István Szirmai, the substitute member of  the Politburo responsible for 
culture and ideology, suggested a way to connect Israel’s “Zionist policies” with 
the history of  the war. His interest in the topic is unsurprising. Szirmai was born 
into a Jewish family in 1906 in the small town of  Zilah (Zalău) in Transylvania. 
Although he started his political career in the Socialist-Zionist Hashomer Hatzair 
movement before the war, he later joined the Romanian Communist Party. 
The early 1940s found him in Budapest, living illegally as the liaison between 
Transylvanian communists and the Hungarian Communist Party. After spending 
the second half  of  the war in prison, Szirmai transferred to the Hungarian 
communists and acted as the party’s functionary unoffi cially responsible for 
“Zionist affairs” during the Rákosi period. His position toward Zionism was not 
in the least bit friendly at that time. He proposed to ban all Zionist organizations 
on the grounds that they were “spreading bourgeois nationalism, adding to the 
emigration craze through their organizations, smuggling hard currency, ‘rescuing 
property,’ and damaging the forint.”42 In the course of  a private meeting with 
39  Chrová, “Israel in the foreign and internal politics,” 263.
40  Jenő Lévai, ed., Eichmann in Hungary: Documents (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1961); idem, ed., Eichmann en 
Hongrie: Documents (Budapest: Kossuth, 1961); idem, ed., Eichmann in Ungarn: Dokumente (Budapest: Univ.
druck, 1961). These books were printed in Budapest but were not offi cially published by any publishing 
house in Hungary. Therefore, it is highly probable that they were not available domestically.
41  “Decision of  the Politburo, 28 June 1960,” in Jewish Studies, ed. Kovács and Miller, 221. 
42  András Kovács, “Hungarian Jewish Politics from the End of  the Second World War until the Collapse 
of  Communism,” in Jews and the State: Dangerous Alliances and the Perils of  Privilege, ed. Ezra Mendelsohn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 133. 
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two ultra-left Zionist emissaries from Palestine in the late 1940s, Szirmai also 
opined that Zionism was “a dangerous ideology based on disregard for realities.” 
He prophesized that in a couple of  years’ time, “nobody would consider himself  
Jewish in Hungary.”43 Ironically, Szirmai was imprisoned for his “Zionist 
activities” by Mátyás Rákosi at the beginning of  1953, when Rákosi was planning 
a Hungarian Zionist show trial similar to the Doctors’ Plot in the USSR and the 
Slánský trial in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that during the 
Politburo meeting in 1960, Szirmai highlighted that 
there are certain matters which severely compromise the Israeli 
government and the Zionist movement. Eichmann knows about 
these things, and the Israelis don’t want them to come to light. Such 
factors also exist. There was that Kaszner [sic] affair, whom the Israeli 
government had shot in order to shut him up.44 
Rezső (Rudolf) Kasztner was a Jewish journalist from Transylvania who was 
a member of  the Hungarian Zionist movement. At an early age, he joined the 
youth group Barissia, the members of  which were preparing to become citizens 
of  the envisioned future state of  Israel. During the war, Kasztner moved to 
Budapest, where, as a member of  the Jewish Rescue and Aid Committee, he 
tried to help Jewish refugees obtain exit visas to go to Palestine. In 1944, he 
successfully negotiated with Eichmann the transport of  one train with 1,658 
Jews on it to neutral Switzerland.45 
Szirmai was suggesting at the Politburo session that Kasztner was 
assassinated because, as a supporter of  the Zionist movement during the war, 
he had cooperated with the Nazis to save wealthy Jews from extermination. He 
implied that the Israeli government had arranged Kasztner’s death to prevent 
him from revealing this connection between Zionism and Nazism. Contrary 
to Szirmai’s claims, Rezső Kasztner was shot in Tel Aviv by a young supporter 
of  the extreme right wing, Zeev Eckstein, and not on the orders of  the Israeli 
government, of  which Kasztner was a member as a spokesman for the Ministry 
43  George Garai’s interview with A. Yaari, Jewish Agency emissary to the Hashomer Hatzair in Hungary 
between 1946–1948. Quoted in George Garai, The Policy towards the Jews, Zionism, and Israel of  the Hungarian 
Communist Party, 1945–1953 (Unpublished PhD Thesis, London School of  Economics, 1979), 128.
44  “Minutes of  the Politburo of  the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party 28 June 1960,” in vol. 4 of  Jewish 
Studies at the CEU, ed. András Kovács and Michael Miller (Budapest: CEU, 2005), 217–18.
45  Anna Porter, Kasztner’s Train (Vancouver–Toronto: Douglas McIntyre, 2007), esp. 9–50.
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of  Transportation. Szirmai’s version of  the story is therefore rather absurd, but 
nevertheless highlights a possible avenue through which the unfriendliness of  
communist leaderships towards the state of  Israel in the 1960s could infl uence 
their offi cial narratives about World War II.
At the same Politburo meeting, General Secretary of  the party János Kádár 
also touched upon the question of  historical interpretations of  the Hungarian 
Holocaust that should be brought forward in offi cial propaganda. He emphasized 
that 
[i]t’s not a good idea to turn these awful fascist affairs into an exclusively 
Jewish question. If  we do act in this affair, the decisive thing should 
be that Eichmann murdered hundreds of  thousands of  Hungarian 
citizens... Eichmann did not only murder Jews, there were others there, 
too. This is not a Jewish question; this is the question of  fascism and 
anti-fascism.46 
By emphasizing the fascist/anti-fascist struggle, Kádár indicated that he 
intended to strictly follow the offi cial communist interpretation. 
Although it is true that more than half  a million Jewish victims of  the 
Holocaust were Hungarians, one problematic part of  Kádár’s statement was 
his assertion that they had been citizens. The majority of  Hungary’s Holocaust 
victims were killed because they were considered Jewish, and not because of  their 
Hungarian nationality (or citizenship), as Kádár’s remark implies. The General 
Secretary also overlooked the fact that by 1944, the elected governments of  
the Hungarian state had deprived Jews of  most of  the rights citizens would 
usually enjoy, restricting their access to employment, education and property, 
and curbing their right to free movement and marriage.47 
46  “Minutes of  the Politburo” in Jewish Studies, ed. Kovács and Miller, 218.
47  The fi rst Anti-Jewish Law of  1938 ruled that Jews could occupy only up to twenty percent of  
positions in the free intellectual professions. The second Anti-Jewish Law, which was enacted a year later, 
capped Jewish presence in intellectual occupations at six percent and forbade their employment in legal 
and public administrative apparatuses and in secondary school education.  Jews could not be employed 
by theatres or in the press in positions where it was feared they might infl uence the organs’ intellectual 
focus. The law limited the number of  Jews employed at companies and reinstated the Numerus Clausus 
in education. Jews were completely excluded from trades that were subject to state authorization. The 
acquisition of  agricultural property by Jews was made signifi cantly more diffi cult. The third Anti-Jewish 
Law of  1941, which appropriated the racial defi nition of  Jews used by the Nazi Nuremberg Laws, forbade 
mixed marriages between Jews and non-Jews and also criminalized sexual relationships between them. 
Other anti-Jewish Laws enacted in the following years discriminated against the Jewish religious community, 
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This illustrates an especially problematic part of  the Hungarian communist 
state’s attitudes toward the war. Kádár’s regime condemned the Horthy 
establishment as fascist, but it placed the blame for the alliance with Nazi 
Germany on “the ruling classes” and their oppression and manipulation of  the 
proletariat and the peasantry. At the same time, it negated offi cial governmental 
attempts in the course of  the war to achieve an armistice48 and overlooked the 
general public’s acceptance and, in many cases, endorsement of  anti-Semitic 
policies. Kádár’s presentation thus deliberately ignored the domestic political 
roots of  and popular support for Hungary’s alliance with Nazi Germany, which 
offered territorial revisions for Hungary’s benefi t, because these details of  history 
did not fi t into the communist narrative of  the war and would have undermined 
the Communist Party’s claim for legitimacy in Hungary, built on the myth of  
widespread anti-fascist resistance. 
Successful Attainment of  Propaganda Goals: the Implication of  the Federal 
Republic of  Germany
Though it has been argued in academic literature that propaganda always 
refl ected the policy goals of  the communist leadership,49 in the post-Stalinist 
context, the two certainly should not be equated. The following pages present 
the Hungarian media coverage of  the Eichmann trial’s court proceedings in 
four dailies (Népszabadság, Népszava, Magyar Nemzet and Esti Hírlap), on the 
national Radio Kossuth, and in the offi cial journal of  the Jewish community: Új 
completely forbade the acquisition of  agricultural property by Jews, forced Jewish men into labor service 
and restricted Jewish rights to free movement.
48  There were a few semi-offi cial attempts by the Kállay government to contact the British and the 
Americans as early as 1942, but as of  the spring of  1943 (largely triggered by the catastrophic defeat of  
the Second Hungarian Army in the Voronezh area in January of  that year), more serious efforts were made 
to contact the Allies to arrange an armistice. With regards to the Kádár regime’s attitude to the Kállay 
government, it must be pointed out that this position was later revised by the Department of  Contemporary 
History (MTA Történettudományi Intézet Legújabbkori Osztály) under the auspices of  the Academy of  Sciences. 
Under the leadership of  György Ránki, the department reevaluated the policies of  the Kállay government 
(in offi ce between March, 1942 and March, 1944), with special emphasis on attempts to abandon the war 
and break the alliance with Nazi Germany. Ránki, together with other historians such as Iván T. Berend and 
later Miklós Szabó, attempted to rehabilitate Kállay’s policies and show that the attempts to get out of  the 
war were genuine. For more details see: See: Miklós Szabó, “A Ludovikától a Magvetőig,” Beszélő 3, no. 10 
(1998). Accessed October 8, 2015, http://beszelo.c3.hu/98/10/13szab.htm.
49  Baruch Hazan, Soviet Impregnational Propaganda (Michigan: Ardis, 1982), 11–12. François Furet, The 
Passing of  an Illusion: The Idea of  Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 
1999), 180–81.
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Élet.50 Népszabadság was the national paper of  the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party, while Esti Hírlap unoffi cially belonged to the Party’s Budapest unit and 
the municipal leadership of  the capital (Fővárosi Tanács) and was more like a 
tabloid. Népszava was the offi cial daily of  the trade unions and, thus, its target 
audience was the workers. Magyar Nemzet was the newspaper of  the Patriotic 
Peoples’ Front (Hazafi as Népfront) and essentially addressed the intelligentsia. 
As mentioned above, Új Élet was the offi cial paper of  the Jewish religious 
community, though it operated under strict political supervision. Hungarian 
media covered the trial very thoroughly, with about seventy articles in the 
aforementioned papers appearing during the trial and one hundred and thirty-
seven articles altogether in the period beginning with the capture of  Eichmann 
and ending with his execution (see Table 1). 
Three journalists were allowed by the government to be present at the court 
in Jerusalem: Tibor Pethő of  Magyar Nemzet, László Koncsek of  the Hungarian 
Radio and Sándor Barcs from the Hungarian News Agency (Magyar Távirati 
Iroda). Tibor Pethő was the son of  Sándor Pethő, the founder of  Magyar Nemzet, 
and had worked for the paper as the editor of  foreign news reports between 
1952 and 1957. He was among those who supported Imre Nagy during the 
revolutionary events of  1956 and was even a member of  the National Alliance 
of  Hungarian Journalists (Magyar Újságírók Országos Szövetsége) that negotiated 
with the Kádár government in 1957, trying to convince them to allow certain 
banned newspapers to be published again. The negotiations bore no fruit and 
Pethő was then employed by Hétfői Hírek, a newspaper of  little signifi cance. He 
was reinstated to Magyar Nemzet in 1960 and thus the coverage of  the Eichmann 
trial was his fi rst major assignment. The politicians responsible for Hungarian 
cultural policies probably speculated that Pethő would follow the principles set 
by the regime in his reports on the Eichmann trial. Sándor Barcs, who had been 
a fellow traveller of  the Smallholder’s Party before the communist takeover in 
1948, was the head of  the Hungarian News Agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda), as well 
as a representative in Parliament and, as of  1959, a member of  the Presidential 
Committee (Elnöki Tanács). Thus, he was a safe choice to toe the line defi ned by 
the Politburo when covering the proceedings of  the trial. László Koncsek was 
an editor of  the Hungarian radio and a specialist on the Middle East, though he 
mostly wrote travel diaries.
50  Based on the Radio Free Europe Press Survey collections available at the Open Society Archives, 
Records of  Radio Free Europe, Hungarian Unit, fond no. 300-40-1, box no. 1606.
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However, many others also wrote about the trial: more than twenty other 
journalists and historians produced articles or reports. Among them were Ilona 
Benoschofsky, head of  the Hungarian Jewish Museum, who wrote fi ve articles 
for Új Élet, and Jenő Lévai, who was considered an authority on the history of  
Fascism and World War II in Hungary and the author of  the aforementioned 
collection of  Hungarian archival documents on the Holocaust published in 
1961.51
…the trial Népszava Nép-szabadság
Magyar 
Nemzet Új Élet
Esti 
Hírlap Other Total
Before 17 8 12 10 3 8 58
During 5 14 20 10 4 16 69
After 1 3 1 3 2 0 10
Total 23 25 33 23 9 24 137
Table 1: Coverage of  the Eichmann trial in the Hungarian media (no. of  articles)
An analysis of  the articles that appeared on some aspect or aspects of  the 
Eichmann trial reveals the extent to which the party line described above was 
followed and the degree to which the Kádár regime successfully controlled the 
narrative of  World War II and the Holocaust. 
Hungarian media put great emphasis on the critique of  West Germany. 
That former Nazis were still occupying high positions in West Germany was the 
most common topic in the Hungarian coverage of  the proceedings, appearing 
in almost half  of  the articles on the Eichmann case (see Table 2). Új Élet noted, 
for instance, “with regards to Eichmann’s case, attention must be drawn to the 
situation in West Germany and the unchanged activities of  the rest of  the Nazi 
criminals.”52 The press also targeted specifi c individuals in the West German 
political establishment. It claimed that out of  17 West-German Ministers and 
Secretaries of  State, “12 belonged to the leadership of  the Nazi Party” and that 
“among the admirals and generals of  the Bundeswehr, 40 had served in Hitler’s 
Wehrmacht.”53 The politicians in question were frequently mentioned by name, 
51  On Jenő Lévai’s role and activities during the Eichmann trial see János Dési, “Lévai Jenő 
Jeruzsálemben,” Múlt és Jövő 24, no. 1 (2015): 76–86. I would like to thank Ferenc Laczó for providing me 
with the manuscript before its publication.
52  “Az Eichmann per ítéletének nemcsak Eichmannt kell sújtania, hanem bele kell világítania a náci 
barbarizmus mechanizmusába is,” Új Élet, August 15, 1960.
53  István Merly, “Eichmann volt cinkosai a nyugatnémet államapparátusban,” Esti Hírlap, April 11, 1961.
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among them Hans Globke, one of  the closest aides to Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer and a man who played an important role in drafting anti-Semitic laws 
at the Ministry of  the Interior during the Nazi period, and Gerhard Schröder, 
Minister of  the Interior. Accusations against Schröder were not new, as his Nazi 
past had been aired years before, even in the West.54
…the trial Before %1 During % After % Total
Reporting on the trial itself 14 24.1 35 50.7 6 40.0 55
Eichmann’s earlier life and career, 
Eichmann’s activities in Hungary, 
Holocaust
37 63.8 6 8.7 0 0.0 43
Alliance between wealthy Jews and 
Nazis during World War II 8 13.8 1 1.5 0 0.0 9
Critique of  West Germany 25 43.1 33 47.8 6 40.0 64
Critique of  other Western countries 
and organizations (Austria, USA, 
NATO)
0 0 3 4.35 1 6.7 4
Critique of  Israel (alliance with West 
Germany) 4 6.89 16 23.2 2 13.3 22
Critique of  Zionism 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 1
1  Of  all the articles that appeared during the period under investigation (i.e. before, during or after 
the trial), what percentage of  the total number of  articles dealt with the given issue. The total number of  
articles is in Table 1.
Table 2: Coverage of  the Eichmann trial in the Hungarian media (issues)
The focus on the critique of  West Germany was perfectly in line with 
the interpretation by Soviet media, which held that during the Eichmann trial, 
“attempts were made to not reveal former Nazis”55 and that Chancellor Adenauer 
permitted “yesterday’s assistants of  Hitler, Himmler and Kaltenbrunner to 
occupy leading posts”56 in the Federal Republic. According to the contemporary 
press analysis of  B’nai B’rith, 
54  For example, Time Magazine mentioned it in an editorial entitled “The Case of  Otto John” 
as early as August 23, 1954.  Accessed October 8, 2015, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,823490,00.html.
55  Govrin, Israeli–Soviet Relations, 77.
56  William Korey, “In history’s ‘memory hole’: the Soviet treatment of  the Holocaust” in Contemporary 
Views of  the Holocaust, ed. Randolph L. Braham (Boston–The Hague–Dordrecht–Lancaster: Kluwer Nijhoff  
Publishing, 1983), 152.
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the press treatment of  the Eichmann case in the Soviet Union prior to 
the opening of  the trial on April 11 was marked by 1) relative paucity; 
2) an emphasis upon an alleged relationship between Eichmann’s 
crimes and present-day rulers of  West-Germany; and 3) a general 
minimization of  Eichmann’s crimes against Jews compared with his 
crimes against people generally. These features continued after the trial 
began.57 
Likewise, in the German Democratic Republic, the trial in Jerusalem served 
as a pretext to attack the political elite of  the Federal Republic: a Jewish-German 
lawyer, Friedrich Karl Kaul was sent to Jerusalem to present compromising 
documents on Hans Globke,58 and many brochures on the issue were published 
at home.59 For instance, right after Eichmann’s capture, East Berlin propagandists 
quickly produced two pamphlets entitled “Globke and the Extermination of  the 
Jews” [Globke und die Ausrottung der Juden] and “New Proof  of  Globke’s Crimes 
against the Jews” [Neue Beweise for Globkes Verbrechen gegen die Juden]. The Israeli 
prosecution was approached by the East Germans to allow Kaul to join the 
team as an adviser, but Attorney General Gideon Hausner rejected the request 
on the grounds that there were no diplomatic relations between Israel and East 
Germany.60 
The Czechoslovak news agency Ceteka emphasized on the occasion of  
Eichmann’s execution in 1962 that the trial had not been carried out “to the full” 
despite the death sentence. According to Ceteka, “fascist groups” in the FRG and 
some other Western countries not only offered fi nancial support to Eichmann’s 
counsel, Dr. Servatius, but also “moral support” in the Western press.61
It is thus clear that the denunciation of  West Germany was a priority in 
communist states. The press and the propaganda machinery reacted in unison 
with well-known accusations that did not present anything new in addition to 
57  “B’nai B’rith Report on Media Coverage of  the Eichmann Case in Communist Countries, June 1961,” 
in Jewish Studies, ed. Kovács and Miller, 242–43.
58  Moshe Hess, Deputy to the Offi cial in Charge of  the Information Section, Israel Mission in Cologne 
to Leo Savir, Deputy Head of  the Mission, 20 February, 1960. Paper of  the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs – 
Israeli Missions Abroad, document no. RG 93.43/MFA/584/5, Israel State Archives.
59  Angelika Timm, “Ideology and Realpolitik: East German Attitudes towards Zionism and Israel,” 
Journal of  Israeli History 25, no. 1 (2006): 206. 
60  RFE Special Report, Tel Aviv, March 29, 1961. Fond 300-40-1, box. 1606, Open Society Archives. 
Also: John P. Teschke, Hitler’s Legacy. West Germany Confronts the Aftermath of  the Third Reich (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1999), 197.
61  “Eichmann – Communist reporting on execution.” Records of  Radio Free Europe, Czechoslovak 
Unit: Fond 300-30-3, microfi lm no. 63, Open Society Archives.
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the countries’ previous positions towards the FRG. Most of  the accusations 
were not only old, but had already been published in the West as well.  
Closely connected to accusations against the Adenauer government for 
having forgiven and even having been supportive of  former Nazis was the 
presentation of  Israel as a collaborator with West Germany. This was a much 
more complicated issue, as the task of  communist propaganda here was to criticize 
Israel without appearing anti-Semitic. Journalist Tibor Pethő remembered that 
before they were sent off  to Jerusalem to report on the trial, István Szirmai 
had instructed them to be careful not to incite anti-Semitic feelings among the 
Hungarian population.62
The issue of  Israeli–West German collaboration appeared twenty-two 
times in Hungarian newspapers and radio programs during the period under 
investigation, making it the fourth most salient issue. The articles claimed that, 
in order to preserve good relations between Israel and West Germany, Israeli 
authorities made sure that Eichmann’s confessions would not affect certain high-
ranking German politicians negatively.63 According to one article, Ben Gurion 
“met Adenauer with a secretive smile on his face and he contentedly patted the 
side pocket of  his jacket as he left. If  one had looked into it (the pocket), one 
would have found a check for about 500 million [Deutsche] Marks.”64 According 
to another report, “[t]he Eichmann-trial, instead of  becoming the trial of  the 
general condemnation of  Fascism, turned into a West German–Israeli affair. 
Behind the trial, there are shady economic and political interests that are seldom 
revealed.”65 Not only did the Hungarian press criticize the Israeli leadership for 
“collaboration” with West Germany, certain articles also implied that the elites 
of  Hungary’s Jewish population had collaborated with the Nazis during World 
War II. Magyar Nemzet elaborated on this issue as follows:  
62  Adrienne Molnár, ed., A “hatvanas évek” emlékezete (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2004), 147.
63  It must be  noted that Deborah E. Lipstadt claims that Ben-Gurion asked the prosecutor during the 
Eichmann trial not to use the word “Germany” but only “Nazi Germany” when referring to the country 
during World War II to emphasize the discontinuity between the Third Reich and the FRG. See: Deborah 
E. Lipstadt, The Eichmann Trial (New York: Schocken, 2011), 25–26. It must be at least considered plausible 
that in view of  Ben-Gurion’s support for the “new Germany” and the reparations paid by the FRG to 
the Jewish State for material damages during the Holocaust at that time, Israel did not want to jeopardize 
its good relations with West Germany by highlighting certain sensitive continuities. Therefore, though 
exaggerated, communist propaganda claims were not completely unfounded regarding this issue. 
64  “Az Eichmann-ügy a leláncolt kacsa görbe tükrében,” Magyar Nemzet, April 15, 1961. 
65  Tibor Pethő, “Ami a jeruzsálemi perből kimaradt,” in Magyar Nemzet, 23 July, 1961.
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Ferenc Chorin,66 who had been arrested by the Gestapo, and his 
“interrogator” Kurt Becher, SS-lieutenant-colonel, negotiated for 
weeks. Several arrested members of  the Hungarian plutocracy joined 
the meetings. Rich capitalists who were still free also took part in the 
negotiations in the prison… The group of  rich capitalists arrived in 
Lisbon on June 25 [1944] on a German private plane. A day before, the 
removal of  everyday Jewish people had been completed in Budapest, 
and two days later, the fi rst phase of  the Eichmann mission ended 
with the deportation of  420 thousand people to Auschwitz. Hitlerite 
Fascism, while loudly condemning “plutocratic” capitalists, killed the 
workers with one hand and saved the capitalists with the other, proving 
its real class character.67
Taken together with depictions of  “shady economic and political interests” 
behind the trial, the Hungarian press coverage not only asserted continuity 
between Nazi Germany and the FRG, but also implied a similar continuity 
between the behavior of  Jewish leadership in East-Central Europe during World 
War II and that of  the leading Israeli politicians in the 1960s. The relations 
between Israel and West Germany, as well as a few selected members of  the 
Hungarian Jewish community and Nazi offi cers during World War II, expressed 
in such images are reminiscent of  older anti-Semitic stereotypes of  Jews as 
worldly, greedy and involved in questionable business transactions “behind the 
scenes.” The victims appear fi rst and foremost as members of  the working class, 
and the fact that they were deported on the basis of  race is underplayed. At the 
same time, one gets the impression that all Jewish members of  the capitalist 
higher elites were exempted from persecution as a result of  secret negotiations. 
Even if  we accept that the Hungarian Politburo indeed did not want to incite 
anti-Semitic feelings, such reports, which featured quite prominently among 
those before the trial (see Table 2), clearly made use of  anti-Semitic imagery. 
In that sense, the bloc-wide use of  propaganda to draw links between Nazi 
Germany, the FRG and Israel (and the determination to frame wartime deaths in 
66  Ferenc Chorin was a wealthy Jewish businessman of  the Horthy period, the director of  Salgótarjáni 
Kőszénbánya Rt., a coal mine and its adjoining factory. Through his various posts in professional and 
political organizations, he also belonged to the closest political circles of  Regent Miklós Horthy. Chorin 
was forced to resign from many of  his various posts as a result of  the anti-Jewish legislation in 1941. 
After Hungary’s occupation, he was among the fi rst to be arrested by the SS. Nevertheless, he managed to 
negotiate a deal which resulted in the SS taking ownership (offi cially for 25 years) of  the largest industrial 
empire in Hungary in exchange for the Chorin family’s departure to Portugal and Switzerland.  
67  János Komlós, “Ami az Eichmann-ügy mögött van,” Magyar Nemzet, April 6, 1961. 
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the context of  class) had the potential to override the Hungarian state’s intention 
to separate criticisms of  Israel from anti-Semitism. 
A Less Successful Implementation of  Propaganda: Public Memory and the 
Holocaust Narrative 
As Table 2 reveals, before the trial took place, the historical narrative of  
Eichmann’s activities in Hungary and, closely related to that, the ghettoization 
and deportation of  Jews to Auschwitz dominated the discourse in the 
Hungarian press. More than sixty percent of  the articles addressed these issues, 
making the history of  the Holocaust in Hungary the most prominent theme. 
The articles revealed a lot of  information on Eichmann’s activities before and 
during his Hungarian mission, as well as particulars about his relations with 
the leadership of  the Hungarian state administration and the Budapest Jewish 
Council. Information about these details was available to the journalists due to 
a remarkable amount of  publications that had been produced in the immediate 
postwar years,68 material to which some of  the press articles explicitly referred.69
A dominant narrative in these pre-trial historical accounts in the Hungarian 
press portrays the behavior of  the Hungarian state administration. “At the 
beginning of  April 1944, in a meeting room of  the Hungarian Ministry of  the 
Interior,” reported Esti Hírlap, State Secretaries “László Endre, László Baky, the 
leaders of  the gendarmerie and the German specialists gathered for a meeting 
to decide about deportations and discuss the details.”70 At that same meeting, 
an agitated Regent Horthy is quoted in Népszava as having said, in reference 
to the Jews of  Hungary, “[o]ut with them from the country!”71 Népszabadság 
claimed that Eichmann’s special commando “counted on the help of  the Sztójay 
68  See Ferenc Laczó’s “From ‘European Fascism’ to ‘the Fate of  the Jews.’ Early Hungarian Jewish 
Monographs on the Holocaust” and also his “The Foundational Dilemmas of  Jenő Lévai. On the Birth 
of  Hungarian Holocaust Historiography in the 1940s,” Holocaust Studies 21, no. 1 (2015). I would like to 
thank Ferenc Laczó for providing me with his manuscripts. Péter Dávidházi and Tamás Kisantal explored 
similar topics, analyzing Hungarian literary texts about the Holocaust from the early postwar years in their 
presentations during the conference “Trauma-Holocaust-Literature” (Petőfi  Irodalmi Múzeum, Budapest, 
November 2014).
69   “A budapesti kollégák,” Népszava, June 4, 1960 refers Jenő Lévai’s Fekete könyv a magyar zsidóság 
szenvedéséről (Budapest: Offi cina, 1946) and his Szürke könyv a magyar zsidók megmentéséről (Budapest: Offi cina, 
1946). “Dokumentumok Eichmann magyarországi rémtetteiről,” Magyar Nemzet, June 5, 1960 references 
Ernő Munkácsi, though without providing further details.
70  “A halál minisztere. Tömegirtás és üzlet,” Esti Hírlap, December 6, 1960.
71  “Horthy és Eichmann,” Népszava, June 5, 1960.
HHR_2015_3.indb   758 2015.11.20.   11:00:23
Reactions to the Eichmann Trial in Communist Hungary
759
government [for ghettoization], but it was a welcome surprise for them that the 
Hungarian government voluntarily provided the services of  20,000 gendarmes.”72 
Not only was the Hungarian state administration presented as a willing partner 
of  Eichmann, but on several occasions, as initiator of  the deportations of  the 
country’s Jews. For example, Eichmann was quoted as having claimed that 
“he had promised László Endre that not a single Jew would remain alive,”73 
implying that the issue was more important to the Hungarian State Secretary of  
the Ministry of  the Interior than to the Obersturmbannführer. As for the period 
following the takeover of  power by the Arrow Cross movement, Esti Hírlap 
reported that Eichmann and his men “found in Szálasi and his men like-minded 
souls.”74
The leadership of  the Hungarian state administration, members of  the 
national socialist Arrow Cross (nyilaskeresztes) movement, and Regent Horthy 
himself  were all referred to as fascists. There appeared to be no distinction 
between the ideas represented by the Regent, who was still in power when the 
deportations began (and whose political stance was based on a conservative-
Christian set of  values that fed on the traditions of  the Hungarian nobility), the 
Sztójay government (which collaborated with the Germans in the implementation 
of  the Holocaust) and Arrow Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi’s premiership (which 
instituted large-scale violence against Jews). 
The terminology dated back to the People’s Courts (népbíróság) of  the early 
postwar years, which were established to prosecute war criminals, but came 
under strong communist infl uence.75 In addition to convicting war criminals, 
they also aimed to discredit the entire Horthy period, and with that, the political 
adversaries of  the communists, while not addressing the problem that broad 
segments of  the Hungarian population had supported many of  the ideas and 
policies of  the Horthy regime.76 The transformation of  the Horthy era into a 
72  “Adolf  Eichmann elemében,” Népszabadság, June 3, 1960.
73  “Nyugat-Németországban letartóztatták Haupsturmführer [sic] Hunsche-t, Eichmann magyarországi 
helyettesét,” Új Élet, December 1, 1960.
74  “A halál minisztere.”
75  László Karsai, “The People’s Courts and Revolutionary Justice in Hungary, 1945–1946,” in The 
Politics of  Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath, ed. István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 233–51. Viktor Karády, Túlélők és újrakezdők (Budapest: Múlt 
és Jövő, 2002), 15; Petru Weber, “A háborús bűnök megtorlása a második világháború utáni Romániában és 
Magyarországon,” Korall 8, no. 28–29 (2007): 134–45, esp. 141.
76  As early as 1948, eminent Hungarian political thinker István Bibó warned in an essay about the 
problems concerning the way in which the persecution of  Jews in Hungary was addressed during the court 
procedures. According to Bibó, the conviction of  criminals masked the fact that during World War II 
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“fascist dictatorship” tantamount to that of  Hitler and Mussolini continued in 
Hungarian historiography during the Rákosi period.77 
During its early years, the Kádár regime maintained this narrative, and its fi rst 
interpretations of  the 1956 “counter-revolution” established continuity between 
the White Terror that followed the fall of  the Hungarian Soviet Republic of  
1919, the “fascist” Horthy regime and the events of  October 1956. According 
to offi cial publications that appeared in Hungary between 1957 and 1959, the 
outbreak of  the “counter-revolution” was linked to the infi ltration of  Hungary 
by fascist elements from the West and the re-emergence of  domestic Hungarian 
fascists from the Horthy era and the Arrow Cross movement.78 The masses were 
tricked by the “nationalist, chauvinist, and anti-Soviet” catchwords used by the 
clandestine fascists in order to gain support. The February 1957 “Resolution of  
the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party with regards to Current Questions and 
Tasks” referred to the October events as a “counter-revolution” but attributed 
the actions of  the population to a smaller group of  provocateurs.79 This minority 
of  inimical elements, the party narrative maintained, “using the dissatisfaction of  
the masses caused by the previous party leadership’s mistakes, aimed to confuse 
the working masses’ class consciousness with chauvinist, nationalist, revisionist, 
anti-Semitic and other bourgeois counterrevolutionary ideas.”80 In order to 
substantiate the interpretation of  the 1956 revolution as having been instigated 
by (domestic and returning foreign) fascists, Kádár’s propaganda exaggerated 
their presence and infl uence during the Horthy era. Therefore, even though the 
Kádár regime did not prioritize the narration of  the Hungarian Holocaust in 
relation to the Eichmann trial, the reiteration of  earlier claims about the strong 
alliance between Horthy’s establishment and Nazi Germany, as well as the 
“fascism” of  the former did correspond to other propaganda goals of  the time 
related to the 1956 revolution.
Hungarian society as a whole had abandoned the Jews before it had itself  become the victim of  Fascism. 
This, according to Bibó, was nevertheless never addressed and the victimhood of  Jews was incorporated 
into the general group of  the victims of  Fascism. See: István Bibó, Zsidókérdés Magyarországon 1944 után 
(Budapest: Neuwald, 1948).
77  See for example: Gusztáv Heckenast et al., A magyar nép története: rövid áttekintés (Budapest: Művelt 
Nép, 1951).
78  Heino Nyyssönen, The Presence of  the Past in Politics. ‛1956’ after 1956 in Hungary (Jyväskylä: University 
of  Jyväskylä Printing House, 1999), 92–95.
79  Kalmár Melinda, Ennivaló és hozomány. A kora kádárizmus ideológiája (Budapest: Magvető, 1998), 29. 
80  Minutes of  the meeting of  the Temporary Executive Committee, November 23, 1956. Minutes of  the 
Meetings of  the Politburo of  the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, M-KS 288.5/4, Hungarian National 
Archives.
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After the Eichmann trial began in April 1961, however, the historical 
narrative spectacularly lost its prominence in the Hungarian press. Close to ninety 
percent of  all the articles that presented the historical narrative appeared before 
the trial. At the same time, Hungarian propaganda was especially unsuccessful 
at having the Eichmann trial presented not as “a deportation story but an attack 
on the reviving West-German imperialism and its Nazi cadres,”81 and the trial’s 
certain details as a series of  events that happened to “Hungarian citizens.” Such 
a goal would have been hard to achieve because, during the course of  the trial in 
Jerusalem, the fact that the great majority of  the Eichmann’s victims were Jews 
came to the fore. 
The proceedings, witnesses and supporting documents of  the trial 
became predominantly focused on the persecution of  Jews during World War 
II. For instance, the trial highlighted the fact that Hungarian authorities had 
discriminated specifi cally against Jews with numerous anti-Semitic measures. 
During one session, a document presented to the Presiding Judge described a 
debate in the Hungarian Parliament from December 1942 on the question of  
labor camps for Jews and the ban on Christian women from work in Jewish 
homes. During the same session, another document revealed that Jewish 
intellectuals had been made to perform forced labor in Hungary in 1943.82 
Furthermore, some eyewitness accounts mentioned the economic interests 
of  some of  the Hungarian population in acquiring Jewish property as a result 
of  deportations. Hansi Brand remembered one of  the marches on foot when 
thousands of  Jews had been driven through the streets by the SS.83 When asked 
about how the Hungarian public had reacted to the scene, Brand answered that 
“[s]ome just stared at them dully—they were the better ones; the others were 
pleased that those who had been bombed out were going to have nice Jewish 
fl ats.” 84 This kind of  narrative ran counter to Kádár’s grouping of  all victims 
under the undifferentiated category of  “Hungarian citizens.” On the contrary, 
it revealed that Jews were explicit targets of  legal discrimination, that different 
81  Letter from Ferenc Esztergályos (Deputy Department Head, 2nd Regional Department of  the 
Hungarian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs) to János Péter with regards to the Eichmann trial, February 9, 
1961. Papers of  the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs Secret Documents, XIX-J-1-j (Izrael), box no. 13, 30/c, 
document no. 0081/4/1961, Hungarian National Archives.
82  Session 51, documents 972 and 1341 respectively, in The Trial of  Adolf  Eichmann. Record of  Proceedings 
in the District Court of  Jerusalem, vol. 3 (Jerusalem: State of  Israel Ministry of  Justice, 1993), 929.
83  On Hansi Brandt, see footnote 5 above.
84  Ibid., 1054.
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groups within Hungarian society had different interests, and that the persecution 
of  one group could mean potential economic gain for another.
As a result of  the thematic focus of  the trial in Jerusalem, very few articles 
during the Eichmann trial in the Hungarian press dealt with non-Jewish (or 
non-specifi ed, general) suffering only. Even if  one part of  a certain article 
only mentioned the victimization of  citizens in general, some other part of  the 
piece usually revealed that they were indeed Jews. Népszabadság reported fi rst 
on Hungarian issues that were discussed during the trial. One article provides 
a fi ne example of  how the Party line and the story of  the Jewish Holocaust 
both appeared within one text. When introducing the Hungarian period 
of  Eichmann’s activities, the newspaper claimed that the documents of  the 
prosecution had revealed “the bloody and dirty details of  Eichmann’s reign of  
terror in Hungary...” including “the tragic history of  four hundred thousand 
Hungarians who were killed in gas chambers and during death marches.”85 This 
kind of  phrasing followed the party line introduced by Kádár. Yet the same 
report later described negotiations with the leaders of  the Jewish religious 
community in March 1944, just days after the German invasion. The article 
presented how Eichmann’s subordinates had claimed that “‘[n]othing will happen 
to the Jews,’ they said, ‘with the exception of  a few restrictive measures. Please calm the 
Jews down.’ At the end of  May... deportations began.”86 Despite the vagueness 
in the introduction, the most common feature of  the Hungarians killed in gas 
chambers—their Jewishness—was eventually made quite clear. 
To determine the level of  relativization of  Jewish victimhood during the war, 
I examine newspaper reports that discuss both Jewish and unspecifi ed or general 
victimhood in the same article. Before the trial, 36 articles dealt with victimhood 
during the war, out of  which 55.6 percent (20) dealt only with Jewish victimhood, 
13.9 percent (5) dealt only with unspecifi ed victimhood and 30.5 percent (11) 
dealt with both issues. During the trial, 33 articles dealt with victimhood during 
the war, out of  which 72.7 percent (24) dealt only with Jewish victimhood, 21.2 
percent (7) dealt only with unspecifi ed victimhood and only 6.1 percent (2) dealt 
with both issues (See Table 3). It is clear that articles and programs that dealt 
exclusively with Jewish victimhood were much more pronounced during the trial 
than before it. The fi rst reports about the trial’s presentation of  Eichmann’s 
activities in Hungary during World War II claimed that “Eichmann was the 
85  “Jegyzetek a jeruzsálemi tárgyalásról,” Népszabadság, May 28, 1961.
86  Ibid.
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lord of  life and death in Budapest and the despot of  Hungarian Jews,”87 and, 
more specifi cally, that “Eichmann traveled to Budapest in 1944 personally to 
supervise the deportation of  Jews.”88 Eyewitness accounts were quoted that also 
concentrated on Jewish persecution. According to an article in Magyar Nemzet, 
“Eyewitness accounts presented last Friday at the Nazi mass murderer’s trial 
revealed that Eichmann beat to death a Jewish boy who stole cherries from his 
garden in the shed of  his Budapest villa in 1944.”89
Coverage of  non-Jewish suffering and combined coverage (i.e. Jewish and 
non-Jewish suffering in one article or radio program) were much more frequent 
before the trial. This suggests that, because the information and conclusions 
resulting from the trial were determined by the Israeli attorneys, the Hungarian 
regime lost control over the terms of  reference, and this in turn led to an increase 
in the number of  reports and stories dealing with Jewish victimhood in the 
Hungarian press. The trial simply did not provide Hungarian journalists with 
suffi cient material to allow them to focus on general/unspecifi ed victimhood. 
…the trial Before During After
Mentions Jewish victimhood during the war 31 26 2
Mentions only Jewish victimhood during the war 20 24 2
Mentions unspecifi ed/general victimhood during the war 16 9 2
Mentions only unspecifi ed/general victimhood during the war 5 7 2
Mentions Jewish and general victimhood during the war 11 2 0
Table 3: Coverage of  the Eichmann trial in the Hungarian media (Holocaust)
Using the Kasztner case to imply close links between Zionists and Nazi 
offi cers in Hungary was another part of  the propaganda strategy that failed. The 
Israeli court was very cautious not to involve Kasztner’s case in the proceedings. 
The whole Kasztner problem signifi ed a deep ideological split in Israeli society 
and politics between the nationalist right wing and socialist-Zionist left wing. 
At any rate, the court was not likely to be particularly sympathetic to Kasztner; 
Judge Benjamin Halevi had also been the President of  the Court at the 
Grünwald trial, in which the Israeli government had sued Malkiel Grünwald 
for libel against Rezső (Rudolf) Kasztner. Famously, the trial ended with Halevi 
87  “Eichmann magyarországi bűnei a jeruzsálemi bíróság előtt,”  Magyar Nemzet, April 19, 1961.
88  “Tanúvallomás Eichmann budapesti gyilkosságáról,”  Népszabadság, May 27, 1961.
89  “Eichmann további 29 bűntársát említi meg,”  Magyar Nemzet, May 27, 1961. This episode was 
brought up during the proceedings to prove Eichmann’s direct responsibility in the commission of  murder.
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ruling that three out of  the four charges were true, therefore not libellous. These 
were: collaboration with the Nazis; “indirect murder” or “preparing the ground 
for the murder” of  Hungary’s Jews, and saving a war criminal (Kurt Becher) 
from punishment after the war.90 The judge was also quoted as having said that 
Kasztner “sold his soul to the devil.”91 The trial shook the Israeli public and led 
to the resignation of  Prime Minister Moshe Sharett in 1955. The government 
appealed to the Supreme Court immediately after Halevi had read out the ruling. 
However, it took another three years for a new verdict, which overturned most 
of  the judgment against Kasztner. On March 3, 1957, well before that judgement 
was released, Kasztner was shot, and he died two weeks later. To avoid the 
possibility of  a similar scandal, witnesses who would have been too supportive 
or too inimical to Kasztner were not invited to testify at the Eichmann trial.92 
With the elimination of  the Kasztner case, Hungarian propagandists lost their 
main angle for criticizing the Hungarian Zionist movement.
A comparison with Polish media coverage of  the Eichmann trial helps 
provide a nuanced view of  its presentation by the Hungarian press. Like the 
Hungarian, Polish media attempted to present the Holocaust in a manner that 
did not contradict the narrative of  Polish victimhood by emphasizing the special 
signifi cance of  Poland in the Jewish genocide. Trybuna Ludu pointed out that
Polish territories have a special place in the history of  the extermination 
of  Jews. The very fi rst acts of  extermination were committed on 
Polish Jews. In the fi rst phase of  the criminal plan the persecutions 
were directed against both the non-Jewish and Jewish population of  
Poland.93 
Yet according to the aforementioned report by B’nai B’rith, “[w]hile criticism 
of  the current West German Government and its alleged links to Eichmann is 
to be found in the [Polish] press coverage, Jewish martyrdom is the dominant 
theme.”94 Though the report has to be evaluated with consideration of  its 
90  Akiva Orr, Israel: Politics, Myths and Identity Crises (London–Boulder, CO: Pluto Press, 1994), 83.
91  “ISRAEL: On Trial,” Time Magazine, July 11, 1955. Accessed July 25, 2011, http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,807322-3,00.html.
92  Neither Andreas Bliss nor Moshe Kraus, who both had relevant information with regards to the 
“Trucks for Blood” deal, was invited to testify, the former because it was believed he would try everything 
to clear Kasztner’s name, the latter for the opposite reason. See: Hanna Yablonka, The State of  Israel vs. Adolf  
Eichmann (New York: Schocken, 2004), 118–19.
93  “B’nai B’rith Report,” 247.
94  Ibid.
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biases originating in the Cold War situation, other sources confi rm this claim. 
A journalist named Kazimierz Kąkol covered the Eichmann trial for the paper 
“Law and Life” (Prawo i Życie), and a book based on his dispatches was published 
in 1962 under the title “Eichmann’s Road to Beit Ha’am” (Adolfa Eichmanna droga 
do Beit Haam). The publication sharply criticized the Israeli government’s way 
of  conducting the trial and accused it of  cooperation with the FRG, but it also 
pointed out the distinctiveness of  the Jewish genocide.95 Based on a rereading of  
various Polish literary and academic pieces of  the period, social anthropologist 
Annamaria Orla-Bukowska also argued that, while these texts only reached a 
limited audience, “the Holocaust actually began to enter public discourse… in 
the wake of  the Eichmann trial.”96 Thus, Hungary was not the only country in 
the bloc where the Eichmann case opened up possibilities to acknowledge the 
Holocaust.
Perhaps more so than in Poland, however, the press in Hungary discussed 
Jewish victimhood without pairing it with a specifi c national tragedy narrative 
distinct from communist ideology. In Hungary, non-Jews who might have felt 
that they had suffered during the war were supposed to fi t into one of  two the 
categories: the working class or the communists. Those who did not consider 
themselves members of  either of  these two groups could not identify with the 
story of  World War II presented by the Hungarian media.
Conclusions: Hungarian Policies, Propaganda and the Eichmann Case
This paper has examined the trial of  Adolf  Eichmann and its presentation in 
the Hungarian press. Communist ideology’s anti-Fascism defi ned its stance as 
“anti-anti-Semitic,” yet the revolutionary commitment of  Marxism-Leninism 
created a framework for an interpretation of  World War II which conceptualized 
the confl ict as one between two opposing, ideologically defi ned camps (fascists 
and anti-fascists). Consequently, it was diffi cult to accommodate the idea of  
non-political victimhood, i.e. the destruction of  Jews based on racist ideas and 
not because of  their political commitments. This represented a problem for 
communist propaganda during the Eichmann trial, a process that highlighted the 
destruction of  Jews as the worst crime of  the Nazi regime.
95  Anat Plocker, Zionists to Dayan: The Anti-Zionist Campaign in Poland, 1967–1968 (PhD Thesis, Stanford 
University, 2009), 106.
96  Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, “Re-presenting the Shoah in Poland and Poland in the Shoah,” in Re-
Presenting the Shoah for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Ronit Lentin (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 184.
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Because of  the Cold War situation, during which West Germany emerged 
as Communism’s main “enemy” in Europe, bloc-wide attempts to control the 
interpretation of  the trial focused on the perpetrators, whom they hoped to 
connect with the government of  the FRG. The identity of  the victims was a 
secondary question—and this led to the relativization of  Jewish victimhood—
yet it was not actively suppressed. 
Despite János Kádár’s speech at the Politburo, in which he warned against 
emphasizing the Jewish theme, Hungarian press reports during the trial repeatedly 
revealed who the primary victims of  Nazi persecution had been. The trial’s 
thematization of  Eichmann’s activities during World War II and eyewitness 
accounts about Hungary made such revelations rather diffi cult for the Hungarian 
press to avoid. This was all the more so because some elements of  the story 
that emerged in the Jerusalem courtroom did not contradict or hamper the 
goals of  the Hungarian leadership. Eichmann was judged guilty even before 
his trial had begun, both in Israel97 and in Hungary.  The Hungarian witnesses 
carefully chosen by the Israeli court described, in great detail, the “cruelty of  
the Germans,”98 just as communist propaganda emphasized the brutality of  
Fascism. Thus, acknowledgement of  Jewish victimhood as presented during the 
trial of  Adolf  Eichmann, however limited, allowed for the surfacing of  at least 
a partial Holocaust narrative in Hungary: the trial effectively brought knowledge 
of  the Holocaust to the broader Hungarian public through the coverage that 
was given in numerous major newspapers.
The possible reasons for the emergence of  this partial Holocaust narrative 
could be found in various factors. The lack of  a considerable anti-fascist resistance 
movement and widespread anti-Bolshevik sentiments among the population 
during the 1940s made the communist anti-fascist narrative completely 
incongruous with details of  Hungarian history that were revealed at the trial. 
The Israeli court’s effective control over what was being said in the courtroom 
made it nearly impossible for the Hungarian journalists who were present at the 
trial not to present Jews as the primary targets of  Nazi extermination policies. 
Just as the Polish state instrumentalized Auschwitz as a political site of  
memory for World War II, the Hungarian regime attempted to use the Eichmann 
trial to strengthen (indirectly) its narrative of  1956. The Kádár administration, in 
particular, wanted to focus on the perpetrators to showcase “fascist elements” 
97  Hanna Yablonka, The State of  Israel vs. Adolf  Eichmann (New York: Schocken, 2004), 121, 141.
98  Ibid., 120.
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in society that, according to its narrative, had been responsible both for many 
wartime deaths and for the 1956 revolution. This propaganda goal was apparent 
especially during the months prior to the trial, when the historical account of  
World War II in Hungary was a frequently recurring theme in the Hungarian 
press. The wartime governments’ discriminatory actions were frequently 
depicted as targeting communists and the working class in general. The extensive 
use of  the term “fascist” effectively diluted its meaning (which came to signify 
anyone opposed to communist policies) and prevented a meaningful discussion 
of  the sources of  anti-Semitic policies in Hungary during the Horthy period. 
As the deportation of  Jews was blamed on a few in power, any discussion of  
the behavior of  broader segments of  Hungarian society was hindered. These 
Kádárist policies infantilized the public and suggested that social norms against 
anti-Semitism were relative or even inconsequential.
Despite its obvious omissions and distortions, the Kádár regime’s critique 
of  the Hungarian government’s behavior during the last part of  the war brought 
important points to light. Members of  the Hungarian state administration were 
not “fascists,” but they bore responsibility for the extermination of  the country’s 
Jews. The Kádárist narrative tried to incorporate the Holocaust into Hungarian 
history (rather than just treating it as part of  Jewish or German history), but 
also tried to frame the anti-Semitism of  the period as an element of  Fascism 
and something that the communists had defeated, both in 1945 and 1956. This 
narrative may be ideologically loaded, but it should not be dismissed as complete 
fi ction, much less as entirely tabooizing the Holocaust. 
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